The sale provides essential funds to invest in a new, fit-for-purpose home and provide an important endowment fund to enhance the charity’s work. The Africa Centre will now be better enabled to support the African communities in the UK and advance its cultural programming aspirations. New programming and events will be announced shortly along with details on the endowment fund.

We will continue to update and engage with all our stakeholders with the sole aim of bringing great African culture to a wider British audience.

All queries please contact William Tayleur on 02072245680

william@businessofculture.com

For more images, please go to the Africa Centre FlickR page

Margaret Feeny, first director of the Africa Centre from 1963 to 1978, died in January last year.

Address by

Professor Ibrahim Gambari

Inaugural Tajudeen Abdul Raheem Lecture

Africa Centre,

London

14 December, 2012

Mr Chairman and Chairman of the Africa Centre

Munira, widow of Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem and their two lovely daughters,

Dear friends, especially Raufu and Kate Mustapha, Patrick Wilmot, Kaye Whiteman

I. Introduction

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am pleased and honoured to be among you today to share my thoughts and exchange views with you on the African Union’s role and achievements in advancing peace and security on the African continent. I am also pleased and honoured to have been chosen by the organizers to present this inaugural lecture dedicated to the memory of my late compatriot, Dr. Tajudeen Abdul Raheem, whose passing away in Kenya almost three years ago shocked all who knew him. Tajudeen was a Pan-Africanist par excellence, a man who was vocal about the unity and total liberation of Africa from all sorts of servitude and alienation. Tajudeen was proud of being an African, but he was not dogmatic. He held strong views about the unity of his beloved continent and people, but never hesitated to call a spade a spade. We deeply miss him. Some commentators have argued that his 1996 edited book “Pan-Africanism” remains a lasting legacy.

Mr. Chairman,

Ten years is a very short time to make an informed assessment of a continental or even regional organization given the time it takes for Member States to fully absorb the need and reality to get over the primordial notion of sovereignty in the interest of the region or continent. It has, after all, taken Europe 50 years to consolidate its integration project, and the EU currently faces many challenges. While it may generally be true that a decade is a short time to assess the AU, I believe and agree with the organisers of today’s event that a review of actions and activities over a ten-year period is necessary and timely to take stock of areas of success, review constraints and re-strategize for the future. I am glad to note that even the AU Commission realised this and recently organized in Cairo, Egypt from 5-6 November, 2012 a retreat of its Special Envoys and Mediators which had as its theme, ‘Transforming the African Peace and Security Context in the next decade: appraisal and opportunities’.

For the purpose of this lecture today, I will use my experience as the African Union – United Nations Joint Special Representative and Head of the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Sudan’s Darfur Region from 2010 to 2012 as a basis for an appraisal of the AU’s efforts towards the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

2.  The AU’s Contribution to Peace and Security in Africa

It is important to appreciate that a necessary requirement for being able to contribute meaningfully to promoting peace and stability in Africa is a sound understanding of the situation in the region and of the motives of the actors involved. Only then can one begin to accurately identify opportunities for enhancing peace and stability and successfully navigate the many challenges associated with doing so.

In assessing the AU’s performance in these 10 years of its existence, it is instructive to note from where it was coming to reach where it is today. It would be recalled that prior to the establishment of the AU, its predecessor the Organisation of African Unity was conceived by the ‘founding fathers’- and they were all men at the time - as an organization that is entrusted with the guardianship of the total liberation of the continent from colonialism and its unity, perhaps in the idealistic assumption that unity could readily be achieved on the continent. Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah’s dream of an “African High Command” was an idea whose time had not yet come. Sharp divisions at the founding of the OAU between the Monrovia and Casablanca Groups forced a consensus among the leaders at the time to focus, as a matter of priority, on the total liberation of the continent, and this was achieved in 1990 with Namibia’s independence.

On continental unity, however, African leaders were realistic to note that there were still  a number of challenges for promoting a full continental unity and, therefore, established mechanisms such as the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (Article XIX of the OAU charter) to address inter-state conflict situations resulting mainly from border disputes. This mechanism was not as effective in mediating conflicts on the continent and, in recognition of the need and determination to solve their own problems and work together towards the speedy and peaceful resolution of all conflicts on the continent, the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution was established in 1993 under the leadership of OAU Secretary General, Tanzania’s Salim Ahmed Salim. However, all of these lofty efforts were often constrained by the existence in Article III of the OAU Charter, of the ‘Principle of Non-Interference in Internal Affairs of Member States’. It is in reaction to these conflicting principles and ineffective conflict resolution mechanisms that the African Union was established in 2002.

3. Transition from the OAU to AU

The decision to establish the AU was taken at the 4^th extraordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU held in Sirte, Libya in September 1999, at which the Assembly adopted a declaration calling for the establishment of the AU to replace the OAU. The AU consequently took over from the OAU with the adoption of the Constitutive Act of the AU of 2000 the entry into force of the Act on 26 May 2001. The AU was thereafter formally inaugurated at the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Durban, South Africa in 2002.

The transformation of the OAU to the AU was indeed a major development and has been commented on by many watchers of the African scene. The AU “was supposed to usher Africa into a new era of continental integration, leading to a deeper unity and a resolution of its problems”. Indeed, as contained in the Constitutive Act, the first objective of the AU is thus “to achieve greater unity and solidarity between African countries and peoples of Africa”. It also demonstrated the determination of African States to take all necessary measures to strengthen their common institutions and provide them with the necessary tools and resources to make them more effective. For our purposes here, the establishment of the AU was informed largely by the desire of the Member States to strengthen and coordinate more effectively, efforts to deal with the peace and security challenges facing the continent. In doing so, they established, as contained in Para. 17 of the Constitutive Act, ‘an operational structure for the effective implementation of the decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, peace-making, peace support operations and intervention, as well as peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction’. The structure is described in the Act as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

4. African Peace and Security Architecture and Powers of the PSC

The APSA has two major components: a normative and policy component, and an institutional component. The normative relates to the redefinition of the principle of state sovereignty and a commitment to an interventionist peace and security regime. The institutional dimension of the APSA is anchored on the AU’s 15- Member Peace and Security Council. I shall briefly focus on the latter.

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the driving engine of the APSA. According to the Protocol related to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 2002, the PSC is a standing decision-making authority and serves as a ‘collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa’. The powers of the PSC are defined under Article 7 of the Protocol which entrusts it with the powers and authority to consider and take decisions on all matters of peace and security on the continent. The PSC has the power: (a) To anticipate and prevent disputes; (b) To undertake peace-making and peace-building to resolve conflicts; and (c) To authorize the mounting and deployment of peace support missions.

With regards to ‘grave circumstances’ identified under Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, the PSC is also vested with the powers; (i) To anticipate and prevent policies that may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity; and (ii) To recommend to the AU Assembly intervention in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances.

With respect to governance and human rights issues, the PSC also have the power: (a) To institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of government takes place in a Member state; and (b) To follow up the progress towards the promotion of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law by Member states.

Furthermore, in order to ensure that actions and initiatives of non-African actors and institutions are consistent with those of the AU, Articles 7.1.k and 7.1.l gave the PSC the mandate to ‘promote and develop a strong partnership for peace and security between the AU and the UN and its agencies, as well as with other relevant international organizations’; and ‘to develop policies and action required to ensure that any external initiative in the field of peace and security on the continent takes place within the framework of the Union’s objectives and priorities’.

Let me add here, that like the UNSC, the AU Peace and Security Council has 15 members chosen from the five regions on an equitable basis. Decisions are generally taken by consensus, however, in cases of an impasse, the Council resorts to a simple majority voting on procedural matters and by two-thirds majority on substantive matters. This is different from the OAU’s previous insistence on unanimity on making decisions.

5. The AU’s Engagement in Darfur

Given my specific recent experience  as the joint Special Representative of the AU Chairperson and the UN Secretary-General for the African Union-United Nations Operations in Darfur (UNAMID), and Acting Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator between 2010 and 2012, allow me to elaborate a bit on the situation in Darfur as a regrettable example of a multi-faceted and complex conflict in Africa, characterized by a wide variety of interlinked underlying causes and a multitude of local, national, regional and international actors, and explain based thereon the AU’s role and engagement in addressing the conflict.

The engagement of the African Union has been crucial in stabilizing the situation in Darfur following the escalation in 2003-2004. The first attempt by the African Union to contain the escalating conflict and the resultant humanitarian crisis led to the signing of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement by the Government of the Sudan, the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement on 8 April 2004 in N’Djamena, Chad. This was followed by the signing of the Agreements and the Modalities for the Establishment of a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) and the Deployment of Observers in Darfur, signed in Addis Ababa on 28 May 2004. The Ceasefire Commission became operational immediately thereafter, in June 2004. In the same month, the AU deployed a contingent of 60 military observers with a small contingent of 310 protection force troops whose main task was to provide the military observers and members of the Ceasefire Commission with security protection in the conduct of their duties. This marked the beginning of the African Union Mission in the Sudan (Darfur) – AMIS.

This swift follow-up and deployment of observers and troops by the AU deserves highest commendation and praise as a key factor in stabilizing the situation on the ground. The presence of the AMIS troops and their monitoring and reporting on ceasefire violations where they occurred greatly contributed to enhancing the security situation and the safety of the civilian population and to mobilizing the attention of the international community.

It was expected that this initial improvement on the ground would pave the way for a comprehensive peace agreement as a basis for the sustainable peace and development of Darfur. Regrettably, for several reasons, this was not the case: the Darfur Peace Agreement, which was signed on 5 May 2006 in N’Djamena, Chad, was not all-inclusive; if anything, it led to the fragmentation of the armed movements and a subsequent increase in violence in Darfur.

It soon became apparent that AMIS needed to be enhanced beyond the capacity of the AU, despite all the support provided to the Mission by international partners. Since the Government of Sudan expressed strong reservations about a complete UN take-over of peacekeeping operations in Darfur, a series of discussions between the AU and UN led to the decision to establish the AU-UN Hybrid Operation, UNAMID, perhaps the highest form of collaboration between the two organisations in the peace and security area.

UNAMID took over from AMIS on 1 January 2008, and while fatalities from violent conflict were significantly lower than during the height of the conflict in 2003-2004, it deployed into an environment characterized by continued insecurity in the absence of a comprehensive peace agreement, sporadic flare-ups of fighting between the Government and armed movement forces, as well as resource-based tribal clashes. UNAMID was the first peacekeeping mission with no peace to keep. Meanwhile, efforts towards a lasting settlement continued through the AU-UN peace process and Doha was soon thereafter chosen as the venue for peace talks between Government and rebel factions.

UNAMID was also the first hybrid AU-UN operation and as such, an unprecedented undertaking. Everyone agreed that there was no room for failure; rather, UNAMID had to serve as a model for future peacekeeping operations on the African continent, drawing from the UN’s wealth of experience with peacekeeping, its existing structures, and extant rules and regulations, combined with the AU’s thorough understanding of the regional peculiarities of the conflict in Darfur and its political leverage vis-a-vis the main parties to the conflict.

The hybrid nature of UNAMID was demonstrated through joint AU-UN appointments of senior staff: for example, my title was Joint AU-UN Special Representative – JSR; a fact that was sometimes found confusing even by my superiors in both organizations who at times continued to call me SRSG – Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. I had dual reporting lines to both the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the AU Peace and Security Department. Both the UN Security Council and the AU PSC provided strategic guidance to the Mission and to me as its Head. In order to ensure unity of purpose between the two organisations and harmonise strategic directives, several coordination mechanisms were established, such as the Tripartite Coordination AU/UN/Government of Sudan meetings, also the first of its kind where operational and some policy issues are discussed in a forum involving the two mandating authorities and the host country. There was likewise the Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism based in Addis Ababa with the mandate to enhance coordination between the AU and the UN on issues related to UNAMID and Darfur.

These mechanisms and structures notwithstanding, different approaches by the two organisations, and in particular by the AUPSC and the UN Security Council, towards a comprehensive settlement of the Darfur conflict sometimes resulted in divergent guidance being provided to UNAMID, which showed that additional enhanced coordination between the AU and the UN was required to agree on the main guiding principles of common engagement and the specific steps towards the common objectives.

6. The Future of AU Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa

Ten years into its establishment, the African Union has had to intervene in many conflicts, with mixed results, in the quest to maintain peace on the continent. In some instances, the AU has been commended for its efforts towards the prevention, management and peaceful resolution of conflicts; in others, it has faced considerable criticism concerning the way it responded to an evolving crisis, such as for example the case of Côte d’Ivoire in 2011 and of Libya last year. In Darfur, the AU has played and continues to play a crucial role in leading the efforts of the international community towards a political settlement of the conflict.

As the crisis in Libya showed, made by African states continue to have limited influence on strategic decisions made by the UN Security Council and other multilateral bodies, including international financial institutions, all of which continue to be dominated by powerful countries. Western countries have often resisted the push by African states for greater inclusion in key decisions affecting the African continent, including through a more pro-active and flexible application of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

The exclusion of African voices on the international arena can be reversed, however, through increased coordination among African countries and the joint development of new foreign policy approaches. This will require, inter alia, a strengthening of the diplomatic missions in Addis Ababa so as to ensure that the respective missions have the human resources and expertise required to be able to effectively participate and input into the deliberations of the AU bodies, most notably of the AUPSC. African representatives in multilateral fora in New York, Geneva and Vienna should also be called upon to fulfill their duties vis-à-vis the African continent and to coordinate their positions better to reflect the collective views of the African states in the relevant bodies.

A stringent application of the principle of subsidiarity, according to which the Regional Economic Communities are the AU’s main implementing agents in the management and resolution of conflicts in their area of responsibility, could also further enhance African responses to lingering and acute crises. In this regard, the year 2012 has seen success stories, which highlighted the potential of the principle of subsidiarity and the impact of coherence in approach and messaging. In particular, through concerted and bold action, the African Union was able to avert a full-fledged war between Sudan and South Sudan and to facilitate the signing by the Presidents of the two States of nine cooperation agreements, which, if faithfully implemented, will go a long way in normalising relations between the neighboring countries and in aiding both countries to stabilise their economic and budgetary situations. The AU achieved this by issuing a roadmap, developed by the AU High-level Implementation Panel led by President Thabo Mbeki, in cooperation with the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which laid down a timetable for action and threatened sanctions in case of non-adherence. The roadmap was subsequently approved and re-issued by the UN Security Council in its Resolution 2046, although its implementation by the parties has been stalled.

Nonetheless, this shows that the African Union is capable of leading international engagement towards the successful resolution of ongoing conflicts on the African continent. As mentioned earlier, this requires that all actors involved-the RECs and the AUPSC and Commission, along with other relevant regional stakeholders- agree on the approach and speak with one voice on both multilateral and bilateral engagements.

Africa continues to push for African solutions for African problems. Rightly so.  As my specific two year experience in Darfur and my engagement towards the resolution of many other conflicts throughout the African continent over two decades have shown, successful intervention, whether through political engagement or with the help of a peacekeeping force, requires a sound understanding of the local, national and regional dimensions of the conflict, including of the stakeholders involved and their interests.

In this regard, it is also pertinent to highlight the importance of including civil society in all stages of processes designed to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. Their input is crucial for ensuring credibility and broadening ownership of the outcomes of the processes.  In particular, the importance of the participation of women in peace processes cannot be over-emphasised. Women, who constitute more than half Africa’s population and are the main victims of conflict in the continent, must be critical agents in promoting local conflict resolution and assisting in long-term stabilisation of war-torn regions. Civil society can also assist greatly in strengthening the continent’s early warning mechanisms, thereby improving its ability to respond to a potential escalation of tensions. Moreover, the youths of Africa must be part of the solution rather than part of the challenges of peace and security in the continent.

The suggestion has also been made that African representation on the UN Security Council needs to be reviewed. In this connection, it has been suggested that the three non-permanent seats on the UNSC should be agreed as follows: rotation of one seat between Africa’s major powers; the second between the continent’s middle powers; and the third by the smaller countries. The situation whereby, during critical periods, Africa is represented by its smallest countries in the Security Council only compounds the continent’s unequal relations with the P-5 on questions of peace and security, even in addressing African conflicts before the Council.

Furthermore, recognising the intricate linkage between peace, security and development, African regional integration, along with efforts towards an equitable development of the continent, in terms of infrastructure, sustainable livelihoods, and the management and harnessing of natural resources, has to remain on the forefront of African policymakers’ concerns. In this regard, it will again be necessary to re-energise NEPAD, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), and develop coordinated positions by the AU and the RECs as to their political and economic goals and the strategies for achieving them vis-à-vis their external economic partners,

7. Conclusion

Ten years into its establishment, the African Union has had to intervene in many conflicts, with mixed results, in the quest to maintain peace on the continent. In some instances, the AU has been commended for its efforts towards the prevention, management and peaceful resolution of conflicts; in others, it has faced considerable criticism concerning the way it responded to an evolving crisis, such as for example the case of Libya last year. In Darfur, the AU has played and continues to play a crucial role in leading the efforts of the international community towards a political settlement of the conflict.

It is widely recognized that the scourge of conflict hinders Africa’s economic and social progress.  Darfur is only one sad example thereof. In 2000, the African Heads of State and Government declared that “There is a need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of our development and integration agenda.” In this regard, the establishment of the African Union was an important milestone towards the development of meaningful collective security architecture.

In the last decade, the AU’s role in continental peace and security represented a shift from prevention to intervention in what were hitherto internal affairs of Member States. As a result, the reactions and attitudes of affected Member States have been typified by differences of opinion and commitments. It is perhaps for this reason that any assessment of the AU’s role has to be based on a realistic understanding of the challenges faced by the organization in its first decade and it is not surprising therefore that the score card has been mixed and there is still room for improvements for the AU Peace and Security Council to attain its full potential. This point can be further illustrated through the following two comments:

(a) President Thabo Mbeki’s critique of the AU at Ten

In a sharp critique titled ‘The African Union at Ten Years Old: A Dream Deferred’, the former President of South Africa Thabo Mbeki, criticised the continental organisation and pointed to “Africa’s failure to exercise its right of self-determination, inadequate socio-economic and cultural development, human rights abuses, and disrespect by various world powers”. He went further to criticise what he called Africa’s post-independence “liberation coalition” largely dominated by an unprincipled, corrupt and rent-seeking group. In his view, the continent has had a poor record in achieving integration and unity, noting that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, that was no longer a global balancer to the powerful Western hegemons who harbour an aggressive desire to “transform all other countries into their neo-colonies” aided by “financial capital’s growing grip on the world economy”.

Although crediting the AU for laying the foundation for the high rate of economic growth in the continent and for monitoring elections, establishing the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), African peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the Peace and Security Council he criticised the failure of its member states for not integrating their decisions into domestic laws, to respect democratic rule, avoid military coups, ansd also for relying too heavily on Western donors to finance therir security efforts.

(b) Adebajo’s Critique of Mbeki’s critique

Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Director the the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town, has noted that Mbeki was one of the “founding fathers” of the AU and did in fact host the summit in Durban in 2002 when the organisation was born, so his attack was curious to say the least, especially as he was President of South Africa for six of the ten years of the existence of the AU. Is this a case of “infanticide” as Adebajo puts it, or, in my view, an expression of mea culpa. Moreover, many of the rent-seeking leadership of the continent which he criticized were h is colleagues with whom he worked closely. Even the Western governmentse that he now criticises, were, according to Adebajo, the same ones he met with “year after year at the annual summit of the G8 to seek “the massively increased economic assistance and military support for Africa which never arrived.”

Adebajo went on to say that while the AU Peace and Security Council has lived up to expectations in terms of bringing energy to focus on conflicts in Africa and on the APRM, some other institutions for which Mbeki claimed success are questionable, for example the South African based Pan-African Parliament, or the African Court on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights. Adebajo also wondered what the AU could have done about Côte d’Ivoire, although the AU’s economic dependence on the West needs to be checked.

On my part, I am confident that the AU will continue this path towards peace and greater stability throughout the African continent. To achieve this, it will have to improve its internal coordination mechanisms, enhance the administrative and technical support provided to the bodies established through APSA, in particular its support to the AU PSC; enhance its conflict management and resolution capacities and work with its partners, in particular the United Nations, the European Union, the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, as well as the Regional Economic Communities, to address the many development and integration challenges on the continent. In so doing, it will have to capitalize on the specific unique comparative advantages thereby leveraging the combined influence and weight of the partners involved.

To be effective, the African Union needs the support of its member states, every African citizen and the larger international community. Happily, efforts have recently been moving in this direction.

Prospects for peace, stability and prosperity in Africa are contingent on our ability and willingness to pursue opportunities with persistence, unwavering commitment and relentless vigor.  The people affected by the scourge of violent conflicts, the refugees and internally displaced persons, the elderly, and as mentioned earlier, the women, youth, the elderly and everybody else require our attention and active engagement to be able to leave behind suffering and sorrow and to attain the peace, security, justice and dignity they deserve. I remain optimistic that given the track record of the past decade, the African Union is up to the challenges and will do much better in the next decade. To achieve these goals require continued engagement and focus, as well as the understanding and support, both political and financial, of our international partners.

Ladies and gentlemen, I thank you for your attention.